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1. INTRODUCTION
Battersby and Bailin’s paper provides an overview and a discussion of a range of
fallacies, or reasoning errors (owed to various “biases”), identified in experimental
cognitive psychology. The main claim, if I understand it correctly, is that this
psychological research can be of pedagogical relevance to those who instruct
students in critical thinking (CT). Specifically, this research may assist in developing
strategies that allow avoiding the kinds of errors regularly reproduced in
experimental settings both in the lab and outside (aka “reasoning in the wild”).
Battersby and Bailin provide examples of fallacies/errors that are relatively
new by the standards of “classical” critical thinking instruction (e.g., loss aversion,
framing, anchoring, over-confidence). Moreover, they assert, cognitive psychology
appears to explain—at least to some extent, and in some sense of ‘explain’—not only
why such errors are reliably reproducible in experimental settings, but also why
they are persuasive: “these errors are grounded in natural reasoning processes” (p.
3). Their paper evidences a current trend which seeks to appropriate research
results originating in a particular strand of cognitive psychology—the Heuristics and
Biases program, significantly driven by the research of Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman—into argumentation studies and critical thinking instruction.
This commentary will likewise stress both the importance of this research
and its relevance for CT instructors and argumentation theorists. If an error in
reasoning and argumentation can be assumed to be “owed to” a wide-spread and
“natural” reasoning process (in the sense of “first nature”), then there is prima facie
reason to believe that such errors can be avoided through some form of prescriptive
intervention. And there is reason to believe that offering an explanation why these
errors are persuasive might help students to “put the brakes on our tendency to
rush to inference under certain circumstances” (p. 7). Yet, this is at best part of the
full story. To speak meaningfully of biases, or errors, some normative standard must
be assumed as correct. That assumption, as Sect. 2 argues, is not so innocent.
Further, I have a mixed attitude about the current trend, which appears (to
me) to run the risk of adopting a one-sided, and a somewhat “dumbed-down”—or
popularized—version of the full breadth of the relevant psychological research.
Empirical results and more conceptual considerations originating in the “ecological
rationality”-research program (Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012) cast doubt upon the
validity status of some of the claims, assumptions, and methodologies endorsed on
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the Kahneman-side of the Heuristics and Biases program (see particularly Samuels
et al., 2002). Battersby and Bailin’s paper stays clear of increasing this risk but, as
Sect. 3 argues, does not reduce it.
Finally, it is less than perfectly clear which de-biasing strategies, or generally
which forms of critical thinking pedagogy, are optimal or even sufficient in order to
reliably overcome biases in the contexts in which they in fact result in errors. The
thesis in Sect 4 is that our perhaps most ubiquitous form of instruction—informally
known as the technique of “show and tell”—may not only fall short, but may even
have adverse effects.
1.1 Disclaimer
To be clear, and because the below may be misinterpreted, I see no disagreement
between Battersby and Bailin’s position and my own. The effects they cite have been
well-established in experimental studies, and are by now widely known (though
perhaps not within “classical” argumentation theory) (see, e.g., Politzer, 2004); I do
not doubt that these results were obtained, I take issue with their interpretation.
Further, the idea that such effects are ubiquitous since they result from natural
reasoning processes—and so are persuasive because natural—appears to be entirely
plausible; yet I doubt that this constitutes an informative explanation. Finally, I also
agree that the challenge for instructors consists in “help[ing] students to see [a slow
mode of] thinking critically as being worth the mental effort” (p. 8); yet I doubt that
cognitive psychology currently has much to offer in terms of tested strategies that
could assist CT instructors.
I hope that the following will be understood not as an attempt to downplay
the importance of Battersby and Bailin’s paper, but as an attempt to bring out the
complexities often played-over when cognitive psychologists, and these days also
argumentation scholars, engage with (the literature on) cognitive biases.
2. NORMATIVE STANDARD
It goes almost without saying that some normative standard of correctness is
required to render the term ‘error’ meaningful. Take mathematical reasoning, for
instance. By the standard of Peano arithmetic: “1 and 1 is 2”; by the standard of
binary arithmetic: “1 and 1 is 0”; and by the standard which my nice endorsed
around age five: “1 and 1 is 11.” So, to claim that human are systematically prone to
err in reasoning (and in being persuaded by arguments grounded in such reasoning)
must presuppose that exactly one standard is normatively correct in some context.
By and large, the normative standard is that which subjects’ performance reliably
deviates from when they solve experimental reasoning tasks of the kind typically put
to them by experimental cognitive psychologists.
As Cohen (1981) and several later authors (e.g., Evans 2008) have pointed
out, for any reasoning task in experimental psychology, sound methodology
presupposes the experimenter to have previously selected the correct normative
standard. Moreover, the correct normative standard, S, chosen for such tasks tends
to be co-extensive with that endorsed in recognized theories of decision making.
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Normally part of our best current expert knowledge, then, S is embedded within a
theoretical framework under idealization and simplification. Such theories, and the
standards they recommend, we may say, are formulated against the backdrop of an
idealized environment, or an idealized context.
Natural environments or contexts, in contrast, are uncertain rather than
risky. And they are populated by bounded agents, i.e., agents who lack full insight,
information, time, etc. Bounded or not, moreover, agents may contingently not yet
be acquainted with whichever normative standard experimenters call “confirmed”
(or “instantiated”) when they observe subjects exhibiting the “rational response” to
(or the “rational choice-behavior vis-à-vis”) a reasoning task, T.
In fact, in some contexts similar but not identical to the lab setting, there can
be good reasons to inhibit deploying standard S, although S remains the correct
standard vis-à-vis T in context C. Much here depends on the phrase “in some
contexts.” It is a placeholder for the conditions (some, but not others, of which are
by now better known) under which our “natural reasoning and decision makinginclination” (aka System 1 reasoning; see Evans 2008 for a critique of current
assumptions), vis-à-vis task T, leads to a result, R*, that is at least as good—and
sometimes, in a special sense, better—than R, where R is the results one would
obtain by deploying the experimenter-chosen S outside the lab (see below).
When much depends on such conditions, it is irresponsible to assume—and to
teach to others—that psychological experiments demonstrate, come what may, that
a majority of subjects err whenever they choose in ways that are not licensed by the
normative standard selected as correct. Rather, whenever subjects do deploy an
alternative standard—let’s assume that some standard is always deployed—, then
they behave incorrectly in the experimental setting. But that says rather little!
One would, or so I presume in the following, like it to come out as analytical
that errors of reasoning are committed, if and only if deploying the reasoning
standard S* vis-à-vis a reasoning task T in context C produces a result R* (aka a
decision) that deviates significantly from a result R, where R—ultimately obtained
via expert knowledge—is licensed by standard S as the correct result vis-à-vis T in C.
3. ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY
The discussion on whether subjects do in fact understand the experimenter’s
instructions exclusively concerns the correct identification of the task, T. Kahneman,
for instance, does on occasion express slight bewilderment at subjects applying, say,
a representative heuristics, although the task explicitly uses the term ‘probability’
(and avoids the term ‘representativeness’)—catchphrase: “they solve the easier
task.” It stands to reason that such results too often fall back upon the experimenter
(Cohen, 1981; Kuhn, 1962).
This may for instance be the case with the infamous Linda problem (the
presentation of which always comes backed up by reports that subjects agree with
the normative standard selected as correct, once it has been explained to them).
Strangely, however, subjects seem to become better—they appear more inclined to
“avoid the error” (perhaps by inhibiting deployment of S*)—whenever a task
apparently equivalent to the Linda problem is formulated in terms of frequency.
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Similar things hold for tasks that mirror the logical structure of Wason’s selection
task, but employ a social setting (so called cheater detection task, see Cosmides,
1989, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). And similar things again hold for the Bayes rate
fallacy (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). So, such cases are not straightforwardly errors
unless subjects in fact understand the task instructions in ways that make only T,
but not T*, the identified reasoning task to be solved.
It appears doubtful (to me) to assume that T—for which, recall, vis-à-vis
context C deploying standard S is assumed to be correct—can be understood
unequivocally by subjects, unless (the deployment of) standard S is in fact at their
disposal. If so, then the deployment of the correct normative standard S to T vis-à-vis
C presupposes the correct identification of T by subjects. If ought shall imply can,
however, then any hypothesis on the frequency of subjects’ expected deployments
of S (vis-à-vis T in C) that stipulates a non-zero frequency must likewise presuppose
S to be deployable; so S must be accessible to subjects.
Moreover, whenever deploying S* vis-à-vis T leads to a result R*, but if R*
does not (significantly) deviate from R, then deploying S* should not count as an
error either. At best, deploying S might here be a process-mistake. The important
difference is simply that S* did not deliver an erroneous result.
But when a choice between two different reasoning standards (which,
respectively, adhere to standards S and S*) is neutral with respect to the result
obtained—vis-à-vis T in C—, then it is prima facie plausible to assume that our best
frequency measure of ‘deployments of normative standards (such as S or S* vis-à-vis
T or T*) in a C context’ (i.e., in the lab) will register values not far from those for
such deployments in non-C contexts, i.e., in “the wild”. One may now perhaps more
readily appreciate the significance of the frequency distribution of T and T* tasks,
and of the deployments of S and S* standards, in the wild. By and large, in the wild it
is difficult to find equivalent ones for the kinds of tasks put to subjects in the
experimental context, C. Put differently, experimental tasks suffer from a lack of
naturalness in most contexts but C.
Given the above, the perhaps most important contribution for a pedagogy of
critical thinking may be the insight that deploying S* may be rational when
contextual constraints keep S from being applicable. In Battersby and Bailin’s paper,
this insight can be discerned in the phrase “put the brakes on our tendency to rush
to inferences under certain circumstances” (p. 7; italics added). Effectively, when S is
not applicable, then task T cannot be meaningfully raised, making task T (what
might be called) S-non-solvable in such contexts or environments. In such cases, the
deployment of S* to T* (instead of S to T) is ecologically rational, and it is rational
simpliciter when R* is at least as good a result as R, but when deploying S* is also
less costly in terms of resources than deploying S.
As an immediate consequence, it would be misleading (to say the least) to
teach “psychological insights into human biases” without stressing contextual
constraints. Whenever some reasoning experiments demonstrate that, in context C,
S* is predominantly applied vis-à-vis (instructions formulated to convey task) T,
then one might ask how such results bear on non-T tasks in non-C contexts,
especially on non-T tasks relevantly similar to T vis-à-vis non-C contexts relevantly
similar to C.
4
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To apply the above to an example, consider anchoring. The term describes
agents’ tendency, exposed in experiment, to be influenced by information most
recently (and in some case initially) received, e.g., in the form of task instructions,
although experimenters select this information so so that it is irrelevant for this task
in this context. In such cases, the allegedly “rational” response amounts simply to
discount the evidence, i.e., to choice-behave as if no evidence had been received (in
our parlance: to inhibit the deployment of S*)—whatever this means.
One can now inquire into the frequency of non-C contexts in which such
discounting is ecologically rational. In a bar-context, for instance—where forms of
“bullshitting,” or “pulling each other’s leg” are normal—, subject’s might frequently
discount evidence. But what reason is there to suspect that, in the experimental
context C, subjects will (with significant frequency) behave in ways one would far
more readily expect in a bar context? There seem to be few grounds to expect as
much. After all, in non-C contexts that bear out a greater similarity to the
experimental than to the bar context, information received can normally be
discounted only for good reasons.
Each observed distribution of subjects’ choices (in response to T vis-à-vis C)
remains of course informative, because it can always be compared to the entire
range of possible distributions. But, although measuring the frequency of
deployments of S* to T vis-á-vis C is thus informative, this also yields a measure of
the dis-similarity of a C context (the experiment) from non-C contexts (such as the
bar) in which S* is ecologically rational. So the explanation of subjects’ behavior
would be that subjects did perceive C as being too similar to a context in which to
deploy S* is an ecologically rational response.
This, then, may finally serve to explain (to some extent) why certain “biases,”
or “reasoning errors” are persuasive, i.e., have acquired a certain naturalness: they
exhibit the ecological rationality of deploying S* to T* in non-C contexts. Note,
however, that this explanation arises from comparing experimental and natural
contexts. Moreover, the explanation depends on C being an ecologically rational
choice in similar contexts, and emphatically not an error. It will, I suppose, be
difficult to find this message stated very clearly in the work of those who have been
inspired by Tversky, and perhaps more so Kahneman.
Finally, it appears (to me) to be a rather non-informative explanation to
stipulate that deploying S* is persuasive because it is natural to deploy S*.
4. DE-BIASING STRATEGIES
The implications of the foregoing for the development of de-biasing strategies and
critical thinking pedagogy may now be discussed perhaps more briefly. When it
depends on contextual information whether a reasoning error is what the term
suggests—information which one must “factor into” a fallacy-judgment—, then we
cannot hope to improve learners’ reasoning abilities, much less so in general (i.e.,
across all contexts), unless we can point out very specific reasons why it is S that
should be deployed vis-à-vis T in C, but it is S* that should (or might as well) be
deployed vis-à-vis T* in C*. Normally, what speaks for S vis-à-vis T in C (the lab) is
that S is the only correct solution for T in C.
5
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Leave the experimental setting, and things are immediately less clear. Unless
we instill in our students the requisite sensitivity towards contextual constraints,
we may expect that they will develop the same attitude towards biases as they
normally develop towards fallacies. Their names are seemingly too frequently used
for the sole purpose of “throwing” them in the face of adversaries in order to gain a
perceived advantage in the kinds of contexts in which humans typically want to
appear smart, to others and to themselves.
To avoid misunderstanding, there are errors of reasoning in the sense that
the following necessary conditions must obtain: (i) solving T requires deploying S in
C; (ii) T is recognized by the agent, and (iii) S is at the subject’s disposal; (iv) S is not
deployed, but S* is; (v) the result R* obtained by deploying S* deviates significantly
from R. To teach anything less complex is, in my opinion, intellectually irresponsible.
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